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INTRODUCTION 
Australia’s  industrial  relations  system,  like  the  New  Zealand  system,  for  much  of  the 
twentieth century has been operating under the ‘arbitral’ model, that is the arbitration 
institution “played a central role in determining outcomes where the parties were unable to 
determine them themselves or where the outcomes determined by the parties would be 
against the public interest” (Peetz 2005b). This system is in contrary to the ‘bargaining’ 
system employed by most other industrialised nations (Peetz 2005b). In the 1990s, with 
increasing demands and pressures for Australia to maintain its competitive advantage on the 
global scale, it was deemed necessary to readapt the industrial relations systems and 
deregulate the labour market. These changes were considered necessary if Australia was to 
shift  and  develop  into  a  more  ‘flexible’  and  productive nation.  This  new  movement of 
industrial relations reforms came initially in 1996, with the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(WR Act). The WR Act involved some compromise between the Coalition government and 
the Democrats. It introduced registered individual contracts in the forms of Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs). These AWAs were to be subjected to the ‘no disadvantage’ 
test (NDT) which was to be applied by the new statutory authority known as Office of the 
Employment Advocate (OEA). The intention of the NDT was to ensure that AWAs leave 
employees no worse off than what they would be under their current relevant award. 
 
The changes were designed to alter the balance of power in employer/employee relations 
through individualisation of employment relations – from the pluralist to a unitarist system of 
organisational management (Roan, Bramble and Lafferty 2001).   Previous experiences in 
New Zealand, Victoria and Western Australia however all indicate that the path of market 
deregulation and individual contracting is not so favourable for employees at the lower end of 
the labour market. What is more, it indicates that market deregulation and individual 
contracting will increase inequalities in wages, result in a lack of ‘choice’ and ‘flexibility’ in 
individual contracts and be of detriment to the union movement (McLaughlin 2000; Plowman 
and Preston 2005; Rasmussen, McLaughlin and Boxall 2000; Watson 2001). 
 
Initially, AWAs were forecast to cover up to six to seven per cent of the Australian Workforce 
(IRM 1998). However, data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 2001 showed a 
different picture, with only 2.4 per cent of the Australian Workforce actually being covered. 
The ABS data does not take into consideration factors such as turnovers, company 
liquidations and the renewal of AWAs.  The movement forecast by the Coalition government 
never actually transpired. By 2005 following another re-election victory and this time also with 
the Senate majority, the Howard government was able to push for further radical changes to 
the WR Act, this came in the form of Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 
2005. According to Prime Minster and the Minister of Employment, WorkChoices will ‘drive 
the productivity improvements necessary for creating more jobs and increasing the standard 
of living for all Australian workers’ (Howard and Andrews 2005). Nevertheless, it seems 
WorkChoices is basically a renewed version of Jobsback (The schema of John Howard, the 
opposition spokesperson on industrial relations). 
 The key elements of WorkChoices are: “unifying labour law; limiting the reach and influence 
of labour and the award system by encouraging commercial contract, ‘corporatising’ labour 
law and constructing exit routes for businesses to become award-free; transforming the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) from a Dispute-Settling body to an 
institution which enforces labour law on unions; and centralising IR authority from the AIRC 
to the Executive and Parliament” (Briggs 2005). The government have suggested that AWAs 
enhance the “flexibility” and “choice” of employees, allowing them the freedom to meet their 
specific needs. It also claims that employers who use AWAs will promote Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and strive for strategic Human Resource Management (HRM) 
philosophies of the ‘soft’ perspective – that is encouraging ‘high trust’, ‘common purpose’ and 
the path to pluralistic organisational management (Waring 1999). However, the majority of 
researches clearly paint a very different picture, that is, organisations tend to exploit AWAs 
as a method of minimising labour costs, encouraging numerical flexibilities, intensifying 
managerial control and profit-maximisation.   These are all characteristics of the ‘hard’ 
perspectives of strategic HRM -  is typified by managerial prerogative, ‘bottom line’ success 
and employees as passive factors of production (Roan et al. 2001). This paper explores the 
new industrial relations landscape with particular relevance given to the implications of the 
roughed terrain ahead for both employers and employees. This is achieved by examining 
previous empirical and analytical research in the field of IR within Australia and New Zealand. 
 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
The Australian and New Zealand, industrial relations systems for much of the twentieth 
century had operated under an ‘arbitral model’, that is the arbitration institution “played a 
central role in determining outcomes where the parties were unable to determine them 
themselves or where the outcomes determined by the parties would be against the public 
interest” (Peetz 2005b). Most other industrialised nations have been operating under a 
‘bargaining model’ of industrial relations, in which industrial relations outcomes were 
bargained between the parties subject to various procedural requirements and minimum 
standards set by state institutions (Peetz 2005b). 
 
During the 1990s, the Australian and New Zealand government introduced changes which 
shifted the industrial relations systems towards the bargaining model, to diminish the role of 
the  arbitral institution and  with  the  emphasis placed on  the  parties handling their own 
industrial relations, thus reducing state interference and therefore aiming at increasing 
productivity and hence national welfare. The objective of this movement from an arbitral to a 
bargaining model was also to change the balance of power in employer/employee relations 
through individualisation of employment relations and Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWAs)  (Peetz  2005b).  In  1996,  following  the  federal  election  victory  the  Coalition 
government under John Howard immediately introduced the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(WR Act), though some amendments were compromised to satisfy the Democrats to enable 
the passing of the legislation through the Senate. 
 
Under the WR Act, registered individual contracts came through Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWAs). AWAs were to be subjected to the ‘no disadvantage’ test (NDT) by the 
new statutory authority known as Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA), which restricted 
the awards to twenty allowable matters. The NDT was supposed to ensure that under the 
terms and conditions of AWAs, employees were no worse off than under the awards. The 
WR Act also “narrowed the circumstances in which industrial action was legal, introduced 
stern sanctions for unions breaching restrictions on industrial action, abolished the limited 
‘good faith’ bargaining provisions that existed, prohibited compulsory unionism and union 
preference, and encouraged non-union certified agreements by restricting potential union 
involvement in certification hearings”(Peetz 2005b). According to the Coalition government, 
Australia required change if it was to be competitive and increase economic prosperity in the 
global context. 
 By 2004, the federal government was the only conservative government left in all of Australia, 
hence no further amendments to the WR Act were allowed in the 1997-2004 periods for fear it 
could endanger future re-election. When the Howard government faced the polls in October 
2004 the election took a dramatic turn. Not only was the Government successfully re-elected 
for a fourth term, but it also, gained a Senate majority. This was an historic victory as only 
Malcolm Fraser in the mid 1970’s and before him Sir Robert Menzies in the 1950’s had ever 
controlled both houses of parliament (National Archives of Australia, 2002). 
 
Having a majority in both houses simplified the process for further radical extensions to the 
WR Act – in the form of Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005. These 
sweeping changes reflected some of the failed 1992 policy agenda, “Jobsback” or as it was 
less affectionately know Jobsack!   The Jobsback policy was developed by John Howard as 
the Opposition spokesman on industrial relations for the 1993 federal election and was 
basically an amendment of the Kennett Government’s Employee Relations Act 1992 policy of 
Victoria. The  new  amendments also  seek  to  take  over  forcibly  the  state  jurisdiction – 
however, this aspect of the legislation still remains unclear, due to the fact that, the states are 
challenging this in the High Court in May 2006 (Peetz 2005b). 
 
According to the government, WorkChoices, is supposed to ‘drive the productivity 
improvements necessary for creating more jobs and increasing the standard of living for all 
Australian workers’ (Howard and Andrews 2005). The key dimensions of changes are: 
“unifying labour law; limiting the reach and influence of labour and the award system by 
encouraging commercial contract, ‘corporatising’ labour law and constructing exit routes for 
businesses to become award-free; tilting labour law in favour of employers by regulating 
unions and deregulating employers; transforming the AIRC [Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission] from a Dispute-Settling body to an institution which enforces labour law on 
unions; and centralising IR authority from the AIRC to the Executive and Parliament.” (Briggs 
2005). Contrary to what the government are suggesting, previous experiences such as 
Victoria, Western Australia and New Zealand have all opposed the projected outcome. In fact 
the evidence points out that, by dismantling the award safety nets in favour of agreement- 
making contracts it will result in agreements which focus narrowly on wages and working 
hours flexibility; the widespread loss of penalty/overtime rates and the growth of low-pay jobs 
and wage inequality, especially for women, young people and low-skilled employees. 
Internationally, nations with deregulated labour markets such as the United States and the 







New Zealand, Victoria and Western Australia are three jurisdictions which anticipated the 
Australian government’s industrial relations reforms. The evidence from these previous 
scenarios demonstrate the path Australia’s industrial relations system will follow. In 1991, 
under the conservative New Zealand government, the Employment Contract Act (ECA) was 
brought in to bring about industrial reforms. The ECA abolished industrial awards, ended 
official recognition of unions, prohibited compulsory unionism, and installed a system for the 
creation and enforcement of ‘individual contracts’ and ‘collective contracts’ (Peetz 2005b). 
The ramifications of these reforms are best summarised by Rasmussen and Deeks (1997: 
294): 
 
‘rapid acceleration of the move to individual employment contract, marked by the 
growth of individual employment contracts (IECs) and the reduction in collective 
employment  contracts  (CECs);  the  reduced  role  for  union  in  bargaining, 
particularly in the private sector; the decline in union membership and in union 
density; and the greater use of legal remedies in employment disputes and 
grievance resolution’ (Rasmussen and Deeks 1997) 
 Rasmussen and Deeks (1997) also highlighted cuts in penalty rates and overtime rates 
amongst those in low-wage areas.  Colm McLaughlin (2000) reported the impacts ECA on 
retail workers as: 
 
“retail employees had very little ‘freedom of choice’, and flexibility primarily suits 
the needs of employer…In relation to flexible hours of work, most respondents 
were required to work flexible hours and days but unable to exercise much 
influence over those hours and days of work…[and] the absence of overtime rates, 
weekend rates, and allowances was widespread…respondents reported having 
no choice but to accept the contract offered by their employer” (McLaughlin 2000) 
 
McLaughlin proposed labour market protection to ensure equitable bargaining procedures 
and outcomes for low-paid employees (McLaughlin 2000). McLaughlin also joined with 
Rasmussen and Boxall (2000) in research which analysed the areas of contract structure, 
bargaining process, conditions of employment and employee opinions of the ECA. The 
results from this inquiry were: 
 
“bargaining structures are predominantly decided by employers…employees 
characterised by part-time or casual employment, in low-skill occupations and on 
low incomes often have bargaining structures and employment conditions decided 
without their input. A significant proportion of workers in the secondary labour 
market find their income level inadequate. While needing the benefits of union 
representation, including improved awareness and advocacy of their rights, they 
are less likely to have access to it” (Rasmussen et al. 2000) 
 
 
As mentioned previously the current WorkChoices legislation is a reflection of Jobsback, the 
industrial relations policy campaigned for in 1993 by John Howard, which is equivalent to the 
Kennett Government’s Employment Relations Act 1992 (ERA) of Victoria. The ERA was the 
death of the Victorian awards in 1993, and for employees who continued with the same 
employer, conditions were just rolled over onto the new legislation. The ERA “established a 
set of minimum terms and conditions of employment in its Schedule 1” (Watson 2001). 
However, “in late 1996 the Kennett Government referred various industrial law matters to the 
Commonwealth Government”(Watson 2001). This referral saw the Schedule 1 provisions 
incorporated into the Commonwealth Government’s own WRA 1996 as “Schedule 1A”. 
Watson (2001) claims that “Schedule 1A employees comes closest to the goal pursued by 
deregulationists: a workforce largely subject to managerial prerogative in which ‘external 
interference’ surfaces only in the form of a minimalist legislative safety net” (Watson 2001) – 
the  fundamental  ideas  of  WorkChoices.  The  consequences  of  the  industrial  relations 
changes in Victoria were a “dual system of protective regulation, in which one group of 
workers experiences only minimal prescription concerning their earnings and employment 
conditions, while another group of workers experienced a more comprehensive range of 
protections” (Watson 2001). The dilemma manifested in the two-tiered workforce, that is, 
wages and conditions among Schedule 1A workers were systematically inferior to those 
workers with Federal coverage (Watson 2001). Watson’s (2001) working paper which 
compared earnings and employment conditions of Schedule 1A workers with those who 
came under Federal jurisdiction. The adverse effects of ‘deregulating’ an industrial relations 
system were revealed: 
 
“Schedule 1A workers in vulnerable industries like agriculture and hospitality, in 
vulnerable locations such as non-metropolitan Victoria, or in vulnerable 
demographic groups fared very badly in comparison with their Federal 
counterparts  …workers  located  in  the  deregulated  sector  faced  significantly 
greater earnings inequalities than those in the more protected sector…[and] For 
those who are already well positioned in the labour market, this process enhances 
their circumstances…[and ultimately]labour market deregulation poses a serious 
threat to a society’s long term future. In this sense, ‘social protection’ is also 
shorthand for the protection of society itself” (Watson 2001). 
 Western Australia, under the Court Liberal government in 1993, also proceeded in the same 
direction with Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WAA), registered ‘Work Place Agreements’ 
(WPAs) which could be ‘collective’ or individual. However, following the demise of this 
legislation in 2003, workers formerly on WPAs progressed onto AWAs, one of the reasons 
for the overstated statistical growth of AWAs in 2004. However, Western Australia provides 
the ideal “litmus test for what might happen to employment conditions for the vulnerable 
under WorkChoices” (Plowman and Preston 2005). Prior to the Workplace Agreements Act, 
the WA industrial relations system had the Western Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (WAIRC) in charge of conciliation and arbitration powers. Under the Act, 
“workplace agreements could be negotiated between employers and their employees. Both 
parties could be assisted by bargaining agents who could be an individual, a union or some 
other body. Once signed by the parties, the agreements could be registered by the 
commissioner for Workplace agreements. Limited tests applied to the registration of 
workplace agreements. Once registered, agreements displaced any awards and the 
jurisdiction of the WAIRC.” (Plowman and Preston 2005). Plowman and Preston (2005) 
stated that a: 
 
“large number of IWAs [Individual Workplace Agreements] did not provide for any 
wage increases during their currency, a period that could extend beyond five 
years …IWAs provided for ordinary hours to operate between Monday to Sunday, 
in effect removing Sunday penalty rates…Most agreements provided for working 
time arrangements to be determined on the basis of management 
discretion”(Plowman and Preston 2005) 
 
The article concluded by confirming the lack of safeguards in the WA experience 
demonstrated that relative earnings of the lowly paid will sharply decline as employers exploit 
market conditions to decrease labour costs. In fact, this will not create greater employment 
but rather initiate a new form of labour pool characterised by low paid, low skill and high 
turnover (Plowman and Preston 2005). 
 
Plainly, New Zealand, Victoria and Western Australia, have all shown that the path of market 
deregulations and individual contracting will have dire effects for the young, the low-skilled, 
and  the  low  paid.  In  New  Zealand,  the  ECA  resulted  in  a  large  growth  of  individual 
contracting; a decline in unionism in the private sectors and the secondary labour market 
was exploited by employers to reduce labour cost to increase productivity. The ‘freedom of 
choice’ advocated by the government in terms of individual contract negotiations was merely 
rhetoric. In reality, employers initiated individual contracts without the workers’ knowledge, 
and thus workers are forced into the ‘take it or leave’ scenario without any real negotiation. In 
Victoria, Schedule 1A employees in industries like agriculture and hospitality faced 
deteriorating wages compared to employees under the federal system, creating a growing 
wage gap. Western Australia, which offers the closest representation of the model for the 
current WorkChoices, demonstrates that IWAs provisions of ordinary hours are misused by 
employers to abolish penalty and overtime rates. The significant trend to individual contracts 
and market deregulation favours managerial prerogatives. 
 
 
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF WORKCHOICES 
The implications of WorkChoices can be categorised into three different areas. Firstly, a shift 
to a low-wage sector strategy is apparent.  There will be increases in the number of AWAs. 
Secondly, there are uncertainties for employers with new risks, complexities and costs – i.e. 
with unlawful dismissal, discrimination and breach of contract cases - fewer claims but those 
that proceed will be lengthier and more costly.  Lastly there are social implications for the 
overall community including the individualisation of Australian society (Briggs 2005). 
First there is  the abolition of the ‘no disadvantage’ test (NDT) with a “fair pay and conditions 
standard” (Peetz 2005a). Under this new scheme, AWAs are only required to satisfy just six 
 statutory minimum standards to be legally valid: the minimum award wage, four leave 
entitlements  (personal/carers,  unpaid  parental,  compassionate  and  annual  leave)  and 
ordinary hours(Briggs 2005). Additionally, AWAs takes effect from the time of lodgement 
rather than waiting for OEA approval. Similarly, certified agreements must be lodged with the 
OEA instead of the AIRC commencing upon lodgement (Briggs 2005). According to David 
Peetz (2005) the major consequences of the abolition of the NDT for AWAs will be cutting of 
overtime rates and/or penalty rates, widening the spread of ‘standard’ hours or replacing 
wages with ‘annualised salaries’ (Cole, Callus and van Barneveld 2001). On top of this, 
under the new ‘fair’ standards, there will be no need for increases in base wage rates, thus 
an overall decrease in real earnings for employees over time. This will effectively leave a 
widening distribution in average real wage, with expected growth for strong unionized sectors 
and managerial/professional employees, despite the declining position of AWA employees. 
 
The other dire effect of the abolition of the NDT will be the expected increase in the numbers 
of registered individual agreement-making with the simplicity of the new requirements and 
process for employers to undercut award conditions on payments for working time and even 
make the award irrelevant. Indeed, AWAs are predicted to be just one or two pages in the 
future, with sample templates downloadable via the OEA website (Peetz 2005b). Lastly, the 
move of wage fixing from the AIRC to the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) could 
mean nominal minimum wages may virtually freeze (i.e., reduce real minimum wages) in an 
ostensible attempt to increase employment amongst the low paid. What is even more 
disconcerting is that, no assurances have been made about minimum wages rises (Peetz 
2005b) – only that they ‘will not fall below the level set after inclusion of any increase 
determined by the 2005 Safety Net Review’ (Howard 2005a). The fact that AFPC will be 
appointed with individuals who are associated with HR Nicholls Society and other pro- 
corporate think tanks clearly indicates the position and direction of the government about the 
minimum award wages – that is, stagnant or even declining minimum award wages to 
increase organisational productivity and lower unemployment. 
 
Furthermore, the removal of Unfair Dismissal Protection provision will create new risks, 
complexities and costs for employers. Even though there will probably be fewer claims, 
“those claims will be lengthier, more costly and proceed under legal rules where the onus of 
proof is placed on the employer” (Briggs 2005). The intention of these changes is to allow 
employers the confidence, flexibility and power to employ people without the insecurity of 
having to face Unfair Dismissal claims every time they remove someone, thus increasing the 
growth in the overall national level of employment (Peetz 2005b). With the new provision, 
larger organisations could divide themselves into smaller companies with fewer than one 
hundred workers to avoid claims of Unfair Dismissal. In fact this will oppose the envisage 
growth of employment predicted by the government. Conversely, the Unlawful Dismissal 
provision  will  create  complexities and  risks  for  employers, since  “the  onus  of  proof  is 
reversed so employers have to prove they did not dismiss an employee for an unlawful 
reason… the process will be longer, legal costs will be higher and where employers are 
found to have unlawfully dismissed an employee, the penalties and compensation will be 
greater” (Briggs 2005). In addition to this, employers are exposed to dismissal based on 
unlawful discrimination – these cases tend to bring damaging negative publicity as well as 
the risk of a financial penalty. 
 
Last of all, the new WorkChoices laws will have adverse social consequences for work-life 
balance, loss of quality family time, and individualisation of Australian society. The move to 
more flexible working time will result in “lengthening hours for full-timers, less standard and 
more irregular hours and increased work at ‘family unfriendly’ hours” (Briggs 2005) which will 
in effect damages “the quality of family, parenting, relationships and health – …because of … 
‘work-life collision’” (Pocock 2003).  This is evident in the New Zealand experience with the 
“average full-time worker is now employed for ‘five and a half’ days per week” (Rasmussen et 
al. 2000) – that is an average of 44.8 hours per week.  Unsurprisingly, the manifestations of 
longer working hours are increased stress, negative impacts on family time and quality of life. 
 It involves the erosion of the traditional weekend and is harmful for family life (Rasmussen et 
al. 2000). As Buchanan & Thornthwaite (2001: 12) note: “in the international comparative 
literature we did not find any references that …delivered superior outcomes in terms of the 
general choices for workers or the quality of care for children” (Buchanan and Thornwaite 
2001). The Australian perspective will inevitably be no different. According to the ex-Director 
of the Australian Institute of Family Studies, Don Edgar (2005), the “proposed new industrial 
relations laws are likely to damage the fabric of family life and make it even more difficult for 
Australia’s parents to raise their children to become competent, confident citizen’s in a 
globalising future” (Edgar 2005). The evidence implies dire social consequences resulting 
from these reforms. 
 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the new WorkChoices regime will lead to a 
low-paid and disadvantaged sector. This is the direct ramification of labour market 
deregulation. The move from unfair dismissal to unlawful dismissal for organisations with 
fewer than one hundred employees will heighten confusion amongst employers, with new 
complexities and risks confronting them. Though there will be fewer cases of unfair dismissal, 
the cases for unlawful dismissal will be more costly and will result in bad publicity for the 
organisation. Finally, the decline of unions will foster individualism in the workplace and 
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